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## *Academia pro/versus ecclesia – a Medieval Model*

### *Academia pro/versus ecclesia – viduslaiku modelis*

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Article traces the causes and dynamics of double truth problem as well the destiny of European intellectuals from the Middle Age to their roles in the present. This Article offers an insight into interaction of mutual interrelationships between three main philosophical traditions of the Europe – the Greek, the Arabian and the Christian tradition; as well showing how historically the understanding of education and academia has changed. Author in a substantiated way develops the relationships between Christian revelation and rational reasoning within the context of European-type university, and describes the way how a modern-day theologian can present the double truth.

**Key words:** theological education, Orient and Occident, double truth doctrine, intellectual and his destiny, Christian revelation, rational reasoning, European-type university

The main theme of the topics to be debated within this article is that of the role of theological education and of the study of theology in postmodernity. This concern brings out, in my opinion, one of the dilemmas of theological education today (I refer here to the theological education in Romania), a “standing” dilemma: What may be the place of theology in the modern university project? The question however can be extended: What may be the role of theology in a university project in general? This question is not at all fortuitous. If we were to use the terminology of a modern of Kantian inspiration, it would probably be: If theology makes claims of being a science, what is then the object of its study and to what degree can it prove the accuracy of its own methods? Does it produce a distinct, precise knowledge about its object?

For Immanuel Kant this was a convenient question from the vantage point of his own philosophical project: the founding of philosophy as a science. Yet, this is only one side of the problem. The other one is directly linked to the epoch in which he lived; it is an epoch whose dilemmas and options he translated in speculative terms. It is known that the 17th century raises again, through Descartes, the problem of rational demonstrating (through the method of deductive mathematic reasoning) the existence of God. Simultaneously, in Germany, the philosopher Leibniz writing a theodicy, conceives the project of a unique language, and together with some Catholic

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and Protestant clergymen, tried to sketch a plan of restoring the unity of the Christian church. All these facts prove, as A. Funkenstein<sup>1</sup> also notices, the existence of a lay theology in the 17th century, or at least the existence of a specific idiom or discourse, in which the theological concerns are expressed in terms of secular knowledge, and the scientific concerns in theological terms. Theology almost merged with the other sciences<sup>2</sup>. Or the target of Kant's "attacks" was exactly this blend between theology and science, in which he sees the origin of all the errors of human reason. What does Kant reproach? – The fact that the two domains borrow and equate each other's concepts and methods of argumentation. The example that he gives<sup>3</sup> is that of "the most real thing", a kind of totality of all the possible attributes.

According to Kant a hypothetical (individual) subject who may have all the simple predicates can be conceived, being thus "the most real thing" and embodying the idea of unity of all realities. Claiming that such a being can be thought of, it does not subsequently result that he must necessarily exist, that he is an absolutely necessary being. Existence is not a predicate, and consequently is not one of the realities which must be necessarily attributed to "the most real being"<sup>4</sup>. The error of the ontological demonstration consists in the process of asserting the God's reality on the basis of a necessary existence of a being that must subsume all the attributes (all the perfections). Kant tries thus to prove that the methodological concept of God is, in the best case, one of the reason's regulating ideals. That does not have any kind of implication over the interpretation of nature through reason. Using the terms of a French physicist of the epoch, we may say that God is not a necessary hypothesis for reason.

For a religious person such an assertion is scandalous. Nevertheless, for Kant this statement represents a reality. Kant's epoch no longer conceives that the human being can experience the knowledge of God. In Kantian terms, God is not an object likely to be part of my experience; subsequently he can no longer have any epistemic relevance. I am capable of an actual knowledge only about an object that my own senses perceive. I admit that my presentation may be reductionistic and it puts in risk transforming the Kantian doctrine into a futile type of philosophy. This was not my intention when I conceived this short introduction, but another one: that of signaling a general intellectual attitude of the 18th century, attitude whose most refined and systematic expression belongs to Kant.

We could question the reasons which lie behind a certain type of option of the Western European culture, i.e. either – or; faith or science. What is the origin of this game of dualities that took different shapes along the European history, among which spirit – nature, culture – civilization are the most widely known? Did ever exist a moment in Europe's cultural history in which this separation between theology and science became paradigmatic? Is it worth answering to such a question? Most of the times the European culture seems to be the place where two different memories coexist: the scientific one, legitimated by the Greek philosophical tradition, and the religious one whose origin is in the Christian tradition. These two traditions give raise, as we shall see, to different human patterns with distinct attitudes and concerns.

Such a paradigmatic moment seems to have been the period between the 13th century and the 15th Medieval Latin century. This episode is known as the period of the birth of an intellectual<sup>5</sup>. Within the next section I shall try to present the milieu of ideas in which this new character was born. If I succeed, than we shall see what is the set of problems that this intellectual inherited from his epoch, and from these, which ones he did not manage to solve and transmitted them as such to the following epochs.

First of all, the Medieval Western Europe of the 13th and 14th centuries is the meeting place of three important monotheist traditions: Christian, Muslim and Jewish. All these three are religions of the book. As a consequence, this period is first of all characterized by important cultural exchanges manifested especially in the massive circulations of texts<sup>6</sup>. What kind of the texts did circulate? Mainly those of Aristotle's.

During the Medieval Age the Islamic world is submitted to profound cultural transformations whose structure and source is defined by two words: theology and philosophy. Briefly said, during this period in Baghdad texts belonging to Greek philosophers are translated and commented upon, especially those of Aristotle's and of the neo-platonic philosophers. This intellectual life is not only the privilege of princely courts but it is available to a large public who like to educate themselves.

In the same epoch, in Western Europe Charles the Great initiates the reforms with double purposes: religious and administrative. It implied that a certain clerical elite should learn to write and read and that they should constitute a group of imperial civil servants. Thus, while in the Muslim space the educational system becomes a common cultural asset, in the Latin Western sphere there is a restricted access to culture, available only in the monastic communities. If, for the Muslim, philosophy is part of his cultural milieu, in the Latin Western sphere it is the exclusive privilege of scholars. This is the reason why the conflict between philosophy and theology, or what is also known as "the scholastic drama" (the conflict between science and faith), is imported in the Latin Western sphere<sup>7</sup>. The problem of this conflict arose first in the Muslim world.

In the Western sphere this period is dominated by two opponents: on the one hand, the representative of the old monastic ideal, Bernard de Clairvaux, and on the other hand, the representative of the new tendencies, the logician Abelard. What separates them? Bernard blames Abelard for the use of dialectics, of Aristotle's logics interpreting the Bible and when proposing some solutions in problems regarding faith. By then the two types of attitudes are already outlined. However we must not forget that this type of confrontation firstly took place in the Muslim world. There occurred the first clash between Hellenism and monotheism.

Thus, if the medieval intellectual is defined through references to an alleged conflict between these two contradictory postulates, then we must be aware that the crisis in itself, its conceptual background, and its mental structure was acquired<sup>8</sup> through an Arabian filiation. The intellectual "drama" of the Western Latin space arose not from the meeting of the Christian faith with the Greco-Latin reason, but from the inner awareness of the contradictions of the Arabian religious rationalism, from the solutions given by the Arabian thinkers to the problem of relation between the Greek philosophy and the Muslim religion<sup>9</sup>.

Therefore in the Islamic world there is the structure of thinking that expresses an inner conflict of rationality. Imported in the Medieval Western world, this conflict lost today its vigor because, to a certain extent, the religious rationalism imposed itself upon an important fraction of Christianity. However, the crisis is not structurally solved in the lay world: facing the plurality of religious vindications and the ascent of various integrisms, the school is at the same time confronted today with a "scholastic" and educational problem. Everything seems to be as if "the scholastic crisis" abandoned the field of ecclesiastical institutions and entered that of educational lay ones, as if it passed from the bishops' synod to the teachers' councils.

This unforeseen resurrection of the Medieval intellectual problem deserves to be

discussed today. “The returning” of the Medieval Age does not lie in the ascent of a new fundamentalism, but in the reactivation of an old crisis which we considered to be solved and, which through a second import, comes back in the same form and from the same place. The problem is that there, where in the Medieval Ages the religious power could decide in terms of conviction, the lay power of our days has to decide in terms of its authorization.

But what was the actual problem back then and who were its actors? Between the years 1268 – 1277 the University of Paris was the place of the argument of three main traditions of Western philosophy: the Greek, the Arabian and the Christian one. The confrontation took place in a privileged space: the university. What each tradition tacitly borrowed from the one another, that became evident later. More precisely, what the Christian tradition doctrinally tolerated from the Greek philosophy for almost a millennium all of a sudden became annoying and unbearable. Moreover, what the Christian tradition considered to be curious and attractive in the contribution of the Arabian philosophy all of a sudden became a heresy in the eyes of the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier.

On December 1st 1270 the bishop censured 13 documents on the grounds of them coming against the Christian faith. Another more detailed one conviction follows in 1277, The target of these documents was the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris. Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and a number of other masters made up an unusual body of intellectuals in the University: their teachings assumed an Aristotelism read through the commentaries of the Arabian interpreter Averroes. This Aristotelism produced a new model of the world, an ethic, an intellectual ideal and a political philosophy that survived for centuries after Tempier’s conviction.

There were three “intellectual parties” involved in this argument: on one side, the Latin Averroism and on the other – the Christian theology assumed by the Dominican fathers (Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas) and the Franciscan tradition (St. Bonaventura). If the Dominican tradition made real efforts to reconcile the Greek-Arabian tradition with the Christian theology, the Franciscan tradition manifested a distinct unavailability for a dialogue.

From the long series of accusations formulated by the bishop of Paris against the Averroists the most important one is the double truth doctrine. Etienne Tempier assigns to the Parisian master of the Faculty of Arts the statement according to which some things are true in a philosophic light but not in light of Christian faith; this is a brief account of the double truth doctrine. However, as A. de Libera emphasizes<sup>10</sup>, while reading Tempier one cannot definitely indicate the author of this doctrine. Did the masters of the Faculty of Arts impose the existence of two contrary truths or is the bishop the one who uncovers such a thesis from their premises? Let’s take the example of Boethius of Dacia. In his treaty *On the Eternity of the World*<sup>11</sup>, there is nothing ambiguous. What is exactly his position? He claims that with respect to the content, reason and faith do not contradict one another when dealing with the problem of eternity of the world. However, when touching upon the problem of form, both the philosopher and the faithful have the right and the obligations specific to their competences: the philosopher should argue in a demonstrative way, and in this domain the faithful should be silent; the faithful should believe and now it is the philosopher’s turn to keep silent. It is obvious that all the discussions revolve around the notions of domain and legitimacy of the discourse. Denying the possibility of a contradiction between philosophy and faith, if each of them contents itself with the truth offered by its own means, Boethius does not claim that

there exist two opposite truths, but that the philosophers' conclusions are based upon reasoning while the knowledge of faith is founded on miracles. Hence, the problem invoked by Tempier does not exist; Boethius did not believe that faith and theology would ever contradict one another if each of them limits itself to its own domains. The actual problem is that Tempier cannot conceive the possibility of a peaceful coexistence between the philosopher and the faithful. That is why he forces the interpretation and invents the double truth doctrine.

Thus, while Boethius wanted to declare his incompetence in the faith problem, the bishop makes him follow the path of reasoning that he had not chosen and to admit that he possesses a double consciousness: of a philosopher and of a faithful. This is the meaning of the double truth doctrine in this case: a double identity imposed upon the philosopher by the theologian. The next logical step is the statement: I believe that faith is true but I understand that it is not true. The relativity of several viewpoints on a single, unique truth invoked by Boethius is transformed by the bishop into relativism, in a sort of double faith.

We are entitled to inquire upon the reasons of this confusion. If it was meant with a reason or not, this is not the aspect we are interested in here. What we have to find out is whether or not the status of such university masters as Boethius was ambiguous on account of the very structure of the University of that epoch. A sociological reading of these events is possible: the Latin Averroism developed an intellectual ideal for which the monastic ascetism is replaced by the intellectual ascetism<sup>12</sup>. Evidence in this sense is provided by the example of Boethius of Dacia for whom the value of the philosophical exercise is revealed by the hierarchy of the soul's faculties: the degree of immateriality of the intellect makes the philosopher the true contemplator of the divine realities. From a social point of view, this polemic testifies the existence of a social body with its own status and ideals, independent from the ideals prescribed by the Catholic tradition<sup>13</sup>.

The appearance of an intellectual in the 13th century represents a decisive moment in the Western history. This appearance is simultaneous with the emerging of Aristotle's texts in the Latin culture. In 1255 Aristotle's texts officially entered the Faculty of Arts in Paris. Within a short period of time the study of Averroes' commentaries introduced in the Christian philosophical problematic a new and doubtful process for the majority of theologians. This was due to the two main reasons: the transformation of the Faculty of Arts from a preparatory faculty where the dialectic method was taught (being considered to be necessary for the superior studies in philosophy and law) into the autonomous faculty, oriented towards the philosophical research imbued with the characteristics of the Averroist system, which seemed strange and unfamiliar to the Christian tradition of Augustinian inspiration. The Faculty of Arts became more and more aware of its scientific independence<sup>14</sup>.

It was precisely within this system where stimuli were found in order to sketch a new intellectual's model. His theoretical profile and his function in the practice of education were in a strong opposition to the professor's traditional image. The latter viewed the professor as cultural priest, an officiator of a cult rather than a combative intellectual and tenacious man not only in the field of thinking but also in that of an action.

What exactly is the difference between the professor's *old* image and the *new* realities? Being in a privileged position of their own profession, Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and the other Averroists (as we called them) for the first time tried

to make the project of the ideal philosopher to coincide with the daily profession from the Faculty of Arts. Siger of Brabant held the opinion that the philosopher's duty is to present Aristotle's teachings clearly and correctly even when these are in contrary to the theological truth. This statement reveals the conception impossible to accept for those who traditionally shared the idea of an exclusively Christian culture. In the 1277 the bishop Tempier condemns some of such theses: the most exceptional status of human life is that which is dedicated to philosophy, there are no wise people in this world but the philosophers.

Under the influence of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* there appeared another type of a person: the one who finds his pleasure in speculating. The nobler the intellect's object, the greater is the pleasure derived from speculation. However, there is one more detail to be specified: through the provisions of the University statutes, the study of theology was banned to the masters of the Faculty of Arts and their students. The University provisions forbade them to exceed the limits of their specialization. They were not supposed to understand without believing or to believe without understanding. Yet, the philosophers although being confined by the status of their specialization, they still faced the object of the people's belief and of the theological knowledge – God. Condemned to private fideism by a legislation which forbade him, on account of having another profession than that of a theologian, to know more than it was admitted, but at the same time free to explore doctrines which by their structure were incompatible with the Christian dogmas, the master in Arts did not have other options than agnosticism or fideism. Therefore, it is futile for the historian to seek for the doctrine of double truth in the consciousness of the masters of the Faculty of Arts. This was imposed by their professional condition. The masters and the baccalaureates in Arts did not have the right to debate a purely theological problem, but there were issues that were common to philosophy and faith over which they had an opinion.

This type of situation was not to be found only in the case of the masters of the Faculty of Arts. At the beginning of 14th century the interweaving of rationalism with fideism became typical especially for theologians<sup>15</sup>. Rationalism manifested itself through the criticism brought to the previous theological argumentative structures, and fideism became an attitude in discussing the fundamental theological problems. The education received at the Faculty of Arts allowed the young theologian-logician to destroy or to refuse the previous theological systems by attacking their formal flaws. And in dealing with the fundamental problems, faith was considered to be sufficient.

We have to reinforce once more: what we called "the scholastic crisis" had already existed even in the scholastic project, namely in the educational, collective organization of a system which superposed two types of teaching: the mastering of the rational means and the understanding of the faith. This was the Averroist pedagogical project because it presupposed the non-contradiction between reason and revelation. From this vantage point, the epitome of reason was the philosopher and that of the revelation belonged not the theologian, as we would expect, but to the common man<sup>16</sup>. Averroes' intellectual project was to purify religion from the theological sects.

This change of focus brought along by Averroes is the very important one, and its influences are to be seen in the following centuries. Driven away from the all powerful theologian, the intellectual leaves the field of the exclusively theoretical debates and starts the so called *vita activa*. He would initiate a unique phenomenon that would inaugurate modernity: the education of the masses. Through a sustained activity, through translations and literary creations of lay people, he will facilitate the

access of the people to the written culture. Tempier's theological intuition was correct: the Averroist intellectual was a danger for the Church and faith. But he did not know exactly how. Through convictions of year 1270 and 1277, Tempier did not solve the problem even by far; on the contrary, he made it more acute. The effect of the new-born intellectual's expulsion from the University was a boomerang one: the blow returned three centuries later to the Catholic Church through the Reformation. We admit that this interpretation is a little bit forced, that we should take all the necessary precautions. We should explain.

The theological education of the people in the Medieval Catholicism is best characterized by pope Gregory the Great's affirmation that the icon is the Bible for those who do not read. The moment in which the "ignorant", who were more or less kept in this condition by the Church, learns to read, the first thing that he is about to do is to eliminate an entire universe of religious representations that he would label as superstitions. The translation of the Bible into German by M. Luther was considered by the Church, which wanted to keep the Scriptural text in the inaccessible zone of the Latin syntax and morphology, to be an outrageous deed. The same Luther around the year 1500 would label that very logician and theologian (that we mentioned before) being a "monster".

The intellectual situation at the beginning of the 14th century is well defined. There was the University crisis, a conflict of the faculties<sup>17</sup>, theologians against philosophers, philosophers against theologians. There is a referential philosophical ideal, that of a complete intellectual happiness and a professional ethics which tries to transform this happiness into a profession. We can agree with A. de Libera who claims<sup>18</sup> that the medieval university is the starting point of lasting work division and its present forms can be easily traced. The function of the modern intellectual is that of a criticism, something which delimits him from the university professor. The intellectual is the actor of the social changes while the university professor is an indifferent spectator.

The central phenomenon of the presupposed scholastic crisis does not necessarily lie in contradiction between reason and faith, but in the birth of the intellectuals, in the appearance of a new category of individuals whose wishes and aspirations are the indirect expression of the university tensions. The medieval intellectual tried to lead the life of a philosopher, a life that was requested and at the same time denied by the university as pedagogical institution. The intellectuals from the 13th and 14th centuries defined themselves in relation to the new model a life – the contemplative philosopher, and not in relation to their presupposed relativism and agnosticism. This model of the philosophical contemplation constituted, as Tempier very well intuited, a danger for the Christian life. This peril was not the double truth, but another truth – another type of relation to the truth accessible to the lay person as well.

So far, what I did was to present a medieval model. The question arises: how important is this model for us, today? The core of this medieval story is the conflict transmitted through centuries: the medieval thinkers did not manage to solve it; it is difficult to believe that we, the modern people can accomplish this task. On the other hand, the conflict is older than its different historical occurrences. It lies in the very centre of the European culture. A. Louth in one of his books named it as Plato's legacy to Europe: the conflict between the contemplative person and the active person. This is a reasonable formula. Does the today university experience a crisis of its faculties

whose consequences are to be transmitted afterwards to all those who participate in it? The answer to this question is quite important because the university is the place of the cultural transmission. Studying in a university presupposes assuming a certain tradition, a mode to relate oneself to the collective memory, an anamnesis. Tradition emerges only there where content is interiorized.

Do we face the same problems as the medieval intellectual of the 14th century? I do think so, although there are other circumstances and protagonists. The present day university is the vehicle of the memory of a culture which claimed the death of God. Paradoxically, theology has its place in this cultural project. The problem is how can theology define its place?

In my opinion, theology should confess and exemplify through the theologian's personal experience that God can be known, that the real nature of human being is to experience God. A contemporary Romanian ascetic father Rafail Noica always reminded: orthodoxy is the real nature of human being. Theology then should clarify the intellectual aspect of the Christian experience. The starting point of any theological course presupposes a conversion of the mind (*metanoia*) from the mundane realities towards the Godly ones. The Christian's real intellection is ascetism and prayer. Gustave Thibon echoing the Holy Fathers said: the prayer is the natural movement of the soul towards God, or more exactly, within God. Finally, theology should state the importance of the spiritual father in the process of theological training.

What can a theologian do in the world where the so-called "death of God" predominates? He may have in mind the advice given by Christ to St. Siluan: "Keep your mind in hell and don't lose hope."

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- <sup>2</sup> Cf. *ibid*, p. 306.
- <sup>3</sup> Kant Imm. (1998) *Critic of Pure Reason*. "Transcendental dialectic", especially chapt. III: "The ideal of the pure reason".
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 452.
- <sup>5</sup> Cf. Le Goff J. (1999) *Medieval Man*, Iași: Polirom, pp. 167-191.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. De Libera A. (1999) *The Quarrel of the Universals*. Oradea: Amarcord, p. 92.
- <sup>7</sup> Cf. De Libera A. (2000) *The Thinking of the Medieval Age*. Oradea: Amarcord, pp. 38-39.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p. 51.
- <sup>9</sup> Cf. De Libera A. (1999) *The Quarrel of the Universals*, p. 216.
- <sup>10</sup> De Libera A. (2000) *The Thinking of the Medieval Age*, p. 59.
- <sup>11</sup> *About the Eternity of the World*, texts and comments: A. Baumgarten. (1999) București: IRI, pp. 129-163.
- <sup>12</sup> It is A. De Libera's thesis, see *opus citatum*.
- <sup>13</sup> It is J. Le Goff's thesis, see *opus citatum*.
- <sup>14</sup> J. Le Goff, *opus citatum*, p. 179.



<sup>15</sup> Cf. De Libera A. (2000) *The Thinking of Medieval Age*, p. 68.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, p. 69.

<sup>17</sup> It is of no lack of interest to remind here what M. Heidegger says about the crisis of the modern university, in its quality being a universal project. He sees this crisis as a conflict of the faculties whose origin is to be traced in Kant's philosophy, more precisely in the conflict between intellect and sensitivity.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. De Libera A. (2000) *The Thinking of Medieval Age*, pp. 79-80.

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## *Academia pro/versus ecclesia – viduslaiku modelis*

### *Kopsavilkums*

Aleksandru Dioșans savā rakstā izseko divējādās patiesības problēmas cēloņiem, dinamikai un Eiropas intelektuāļa liktenim un tā aktualitātei šodien.

Teoloģiskajā izglītībā esošās dilemmas ir ilglaicīgas, bet tās īpaši aktualizējas ar kantiānisma inspirēto problēmjaudājumu: vai teoloģija ir zinātne, un, ja tā, tad kāds ir tās pētniecības priekšmets un metode? Kanta filozofija atsaucas sava laikmeta dilemmām, ko jau 17. gs. Dieva eksistences pierādīšanai izvirzīja Dekarts (ar matemātiskās spriešanas palīdzību) un Leibnics (centienos iezīmēt kristīgās Baznīcas vienotības atjaunošanu). Šajā kontekstā 17. gadsimtā pastāvēja laju teoloģija un teoloģiskā doma tika pausta sekulāros jēdzienos un zinātniskos terminos.

Vai Kants protestēja pret šo teoloģijas un zinātnes sapludināšanu, apgalvojot, ka individuālais (hipotētiskais) subjekts var tikt izdomāts, bet iedomātai būtnei nav nepieciešami jāeksistē? Sekojoši – cilvēks var izzināt tikai to, kas tverams sajūtās. Reliģiskam cilvēkam tas bija nepieņemami. No šīs dualitātes radās divas atšķirīgas tradīcijas un divi attieksmju veidi, jauns intelektuālais īpatnis.

A. Dioșans atskatās parādības vēsturiskajās saknēs Eiropas vēsturē 13. un 14. gadsimtā, kad aizsākās nozīmīgi kultūras apmaiņas procesi starp kristiešiem, musulmaņiem un jūdiem.

Viduslaiku islama pasaulē teoloģijas un filozofijas darbi kļuva par vispārējās

kultūras ieguvumu, bet Rietumeiropā pieeja kultūrai bija tikai ierobežotai sabiedrības daļai, pamatā klosteru iemītniekiem. Līdz ar to Eiropā izveidojās dažādas izpratnes par izglītības sistēmām, veidojot opozīciju starp monasticisma pārstāvi Bernardu no Klervo un jauno tendenču aizstāvi Abelāru, jeb sadursmi starp hellēnismu un monoteismu.

Rietumeiropas intelektuālā “drāma” (konflikts starp ticību un zinātni) neveidojās, kristīgajai ticībai sastopoties ar grieķu un latīņu prātu, bet gan arābu racionālisma pretrunīguma apjaušanas rezultātā; tā izauga no arābu domātāju piedāvātajiem risinājumiem, kuri bija veidojušies uz grieķu filozofijas un musulmaņu reliģijas savstarpējo attiecību pamata. Importēts Viduslaiku Rietumu pasaulē, šis konflikts jūtams arī šodien – kā reliģiozā racionālisma uzkundzēšanās ievērojamai kristietības daļai, ar vienu atšķirību, ka “sholastikas krīze” no ekleziastiskām institūcijām pārgājusi uz izglītošanas principiem.

Senās krīzes aktivizēšanās būtība ir tāda, ka jautājumos, kuri viduslaikos tika risināti ar pārliecības spēku, mūsdienās laju varai jānodarbojas ar savas autoritātes nostiprināšanu.

Atgriežoties pie sākotnējās problēmas, jāatzīmē, ka 13. gs. Parīzes universitāte bija argumentācijas placdarms Rietumu filozofijas galvenajām tradīcijām – grieķu, arābu, kristiešu. Tradīcijas bija nemanāmi savstarpēji ietekmējušās; kristieši daudz ko spēja pieciest grieķu un arābu filozofijā. Savukārt Parīzes bīskapa Etjēna Tempjē (*Etienne Tempier*) acīs šī mijiedarbība šķita ķecerība un izraisīja asas diskusijas. Visa diskursa laikā izdalījās trīs “intelektuālie grupējumi” – latīņu averoisti, dominikāņu (Alberts Lielais, Akvīnas Toms) un franciskāņu (sv. Bonaventūra) tradīcijas teologi.

Taču jāatzīst, ka Tempjē nosodījums averoistiem par divējādās patiesības doktrīnu nedod skaidras norādes par tās autoru. Analizējot Dācijas Boēciju, redzams, ka Boēciji nebūt neapgalvo, ka pastāv kādas divas nesamierināmas patiesības – teoloģiskās un filozofiskās zināšanas. Galvenā problēma, autoraprāt, ir Tempjē nespēja iedomāties mierīgu līdzspastāvēšanu starp filozofu un ticīgo. Divu dažādu viedokļu relatīvumu attiecībā pret vienu unikālu patiesību, kuru aizstāvēja Boēciji, Parīzes bīskaps pārvērta relatīvismā jeb savdabīgā “divu ticību” priekšmetā.

Kādi bija šī jucekļa iemesli? Ir iespējams šāds aprakstīto notikumu socioloģisks lasījums: latīņu averoisms bija attīstījis intelektuālo ideālu, kurā klosteru dzīves askēzi aizstāja ar intelektuālo askēzi. Aplūkotā polemika liecina par jaunas sociālās grupas parādīšanos, kurai ir savi ideāli un savs statuss, kas atšķiras no katoliskās tradīcijas.

Intelektuāla kā indivīda parādīšanās 13. gadsimtā iezīmēja svarīgu pavērsienu Rietumeiropas vēsturē. Tas notika vienlaicīgi ar Aristoteļa darbu ienākšanu latīņu kultūras aprītē. Averoesa komentāru pētniecība ieviesa kristīgās filozofijas problemātikā jaunas, bet lielākā daļā teologu apšaubītas idejas. Līdz ar to Parīzes universitātē aizsākās citāda profesūras izpratne (no kulta kalpotāja uz intelektuāli) un arvien vairāk universitāte apzinājās savu pētniecisko neatkarību. Tā laika universitātes profesionālie noteikumi nepieļāva pārsniegt savas specializācijas robežas, filozofiju atdalīja no teoloģijas, bet šie reglamenti nevarēja filozofu nodalīt no vispārējās cilvēku ticības un zināšanām par Dievu. Radusies objektīvā situācija, kurā valdīja aizliegumi filozofiem pārsniegt savas kompetences robežas, lika pasniedzējiem izvēlēties agnosticismu vai fideismu, vai arī abu sajaukumu. Racionālisms izpaudās kā iepriekšējo teoloģisko argumentatīvo struktūru kritika, savukārt fideisms kļuva par attieksmes pamatu, diskutējot par teoloģiskiem jautājumiem.

Autors secina, ka “sholastikas krīze” jau bija ieprogrammēta pašā sholastikas

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projektā, proti, izglītības sistēmas kolektīvajā organizācijā, kas uzslāņoja vienu otram diva veida apmācības principus: racionālās domāšanas līdzekļu apguvi un ticības sapratni. Tas bija averoistu pedagoģijas projekts ar iepriekšpieņemumu par prātu un atklāsmes nepretrunīgumu. Taču atklāsme piederēja nevis teologam, bet gan vienkāršajam ticīgajam cilvēkam.

Akcentu maiņas sekas – padzīts no teologa aizbildnības, intelektuālis atstās tīrās teorētiskās diskusijas novadu un aizsāks masu izglītošanu. Šeit Tempjē teoloģiskā intuīcija bija pareiza: averoisma intelektuālis kļuva par draudu Baznīcai un ticībai, bet, nezinot šīs parādības iemeslus, Tempjē problēmu saasināja vēl vairāk. Līdz tam tauta tika izglītota Baznīcas tradīcijas izpratnē, bet masu izglītošanas ietekmē, iegūstot prasmes lasīt un rakstīt, pirmā lieta, ko viņi gatavojās darīt, bija atnest reliģisko artefaktu rezultātā iegūto priekšstatu par Universu, piekarinot tam mājtīcības birku.

Sholastikas krīzes centrālais elements nebūt nav pretruna starp prātu un ticību; tās īpatnība saistāma ar jauna tipa intelektuāļu dzimšanu, kuri netieši atspoguļo spriedzi tā laika universitātē. Viduslaiku intelektuāļi centās dzīvot kā filozofi, un šis kontemplatīvās dzīves modelis apdraudēja kristīgo dzīvi. Briesmas slēpās nevis dubultajā patiesībā, bet cita veida izpratnē par patiesību, kas izpaužas kā konflikts starp kontemplatīvu un aktīvu personu.

Vai mūsu priekšā ir tās pašas problēmas, ar kādām sastapās viduslaiku intelektuālis 13. un 14. gadsimtā? Mūsdienų universitāte ir tādas kultūras pārmantošanas līdzeklis, kura nāca klajā ar tēzi par Dieva nāvi. Dīvainā kārtā arī teoloģijai atvēlēta zināma loma šai projektā, tāpēc problēma saistāma ar teoloģijas spēju nodefinēt savu vietu. Pēc autora domām, teologam vajadzētu atzīt, ka Dievs var būt zināšanu objekts, un demonstrēt šādu atziņu ar savu personīgo stāju, proti, parādīt, ka cilvēka patiesā daba ir izjust un piedzīvot Dievu. Teoloģijai būtu nepieciešams padarīt skaidrus kristīgā pārdzīvojuma intelektuālos aspektus, ņemot vērā, ka patiesā intelektuālā darbība kristiešiem ir askēze un lūgšana.

Ko teologs var darīt pasaulē, kurā valda tā saucamā “Dieva nāve”? Viņam vajag paturēt prātā Kristus padomu Sv. Siluānam: “Turi savu prātu ellē un nezaudē cerību.”



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